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Abstract 
 
In South Africa, with the advent of democracy, both land and water institutions have undergone, and are 
still undergoing reform measures, especially to address equity and promote rural development. However, 
despite the apparent inter-linkages of land and water in rural livelihoods and agricultural development, the 
implementation of such reforms has been done separately.  Water reform advocates for the registration and 
licensing of all non-domestic water use. In terms of the National Water Act (1998), water should be 
governed in a decentralised manner where new institutions (Water User Associations – WUA, and 
Catchment Management Agencies – CMA) are established to encourage user participation in decision 
making, efficiency and equity in water use. On the other hand, in the framework of land reform, with the 
future implementation of the Communal Land Rights Act of 2004 (CLARA), communal land is to be 
restructured, probably privatised. Two major questions come to the fore: Does the separate implementation 
of the water and land reforms have implications for rural livelihoods and agricultural development, 
particularly regarding inconsistencies of water and land rights respectively? Would articulating the two 
reforms lead to improved opportunities to address equity and promote rural development? Field work 
conducted on the communal small scale irrigation schemes of Nzhelele and Thabina highlighted not only 
the lack of coherence between the land and water reform programmes, but it also showed the 
implementation constraints of the programmes individually. Although articulating land reform to water 
reform seems necessary – the lack of effective implementation of water reform remains an obstacle, 
constraining rural livelihoods and agricultural development. In addition, for it to effectively address equity 
and promote rural development, it seems necessary for the water or land reforms to be linked to broader 
agrarian reforms, taking into consideration support services, market access and the overall rural, often 
multiple, livelihoods and strategies. 
 
Keywords: water and land reform, water and land rights, small-scale irrigation schemes, 
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1. Introduction - The separate implementation of land and water reform in South 
Africa 
 
 As rural economies are mainly agrarian based, their development is linked to 
access to natural resources (Leach et al, 1997). Land and water form part of the most 
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crucial of these natural resources. Since land and water are finite and scarce resources, 
access to them needs to be regulated, particularly to achieve equity and sustainability. 
 Institutions, both formal and informal, are the basis by which local communities 
gain access and exert control on the use of resources like land and water. In South Africa 
(SA), both land and water institutions have undergone reform measures with the advent 
of democracy, especially to address the racially motivated unequal access occasioned by 
segregatory colonial rule and apartheid.  
 The democratic government of SA introduced the Water Act No.36 in 1998, 
which mainly sought to achieve sustainability, efficiency and equity in water resources 
management (SA, 1998). For this to be done effectively, government has adopted the 
integrated water resources management (IWRM) framework, which emphasises the 
principles of decentralisation and user participation (DWAF, 2004). The new legislation 
allows users to participate in decision making by decentralising water management to 
catchment levels, and to local levels where users form a Water User Association (WUA) 
(Jaspers, 2001). On the land side, government is dealing with insecure communal land 
tenure found mostly in the former homelands, through the Communal Land Rights Act 
(CLARA). Although CLARA is still to be implemented, it aims at creating institutions to 
better define and secure ownership and use of land (SA, 2004). This ownership can be on 
the communal, co-operative basis, or in the extreme case, might lead to individualised 
privatisation (Anseeuw, 2006).  
 However, despite the apparent inter linkages of land and water in agrarian 
livelihoods and economies, the implementation of such reforms has been done separately. 
The issue of the lack of links between water and land rights is problematic, particularly in 
emerging and small scale irrigation farms. As such, under the NWA, only WUAs may 
apply for an irrigation water use license and may be granted the right to use non domestic 
water (SA, 1998). Linked to the individualisation of land rights this could become a 
problem, as failure to become a member would limit individuals’ right to use water 
(Perret, 2002). Also, through tenure reform, co-operatively managed communal land may 
be transformed into scattered, individual plots if members opt for privatisation. This leads 
to a communal water right to be replaced by several individual private water rights. 
Where there are transfers of land rights, through the land market, there may also be a loss 
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of water rights because a water right is held separately from the land right. The new land 
owner has to go through a separate process to acquire water rights.  
 Communal areas have had a history of underutilisation of land (Kamara et al, 
2002). Currently, there is fallow land in communal small scale irrigation schemes (SIS), 
even in cases where water is available. Given the possible individualisation of land rights, 
will this improve the SIS farmers’ access to water and utilisation of plot land? In 
addition, WUAs are likely to impose water management rules and schedules, which are 
often sources of conflicts and discontentment in farming communities (Faysse, 2004).  
 The paper aims at identifying the problems arising from the uncoordinated 
implementation of land and water reforms. According to the problem identified, the main 
objective is to analyse the potential contribution of land tenure reform on small holder 
irrigation on communal land. 
 
2. Research Methodology – Assessing productivity and land use in two irrigations 
schemes in the Limpopo Province of SA 
 
 An empirical enquiry was done using case studies. The case study sites picked for 
the studies are both in the Limpopo Province of SA. Limpopo is one of the country’s 
major commercial agricultural regions, and the implementation of water reform started in 
this Province in 2005. As a result, the trajectory of the success or failure of a WUA can 
already be assessed. 
 Two sites were analysed in order to allow comparison. These two schemes were 
chosen because they are on communal land that is set to undergo land tenure reform; they 
have active irrigation farming going on and the schemes have officially undergone water 
reform. The two SIS identified are Nzhelele and Thabina.  
 Nzhelele Irrigations Schemes consist of 13 villages lying along the Nzhelele River 
Valley. The area is located to the North of the city of Polokwane in Limpopo, in the rural 
part of Vhembe District Municipality. The farmers settled in this area in the 1950s after 
being displaced by white commercial farmers to the North. The government then 
established the schemes in 1963, with each village getting a scheme on its communal 
arable dry land. Thabina Irrigation Scheme consists of four sections (called Wards) 
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stretching along the Thabina River.1 Thabina lies North East of Polokwane, 24km to the 
South East of the town of Tzaneen, in the Capricorn District Municipality of Limpopo. It 
is in a peri-urban area. Unlike in Nzhelele, communal land was identified near the 
community in 1962, where the government built the scheme. Community members from 
the surrounding villages who were interested in farming were allowed to join.  
  
2.1 Sampling 
 Purpose sampling was employed to collect data. In Nzhelele, accessing all the 
village schemes was difficult. After observing landuse and water use patterns in the 13 
villages and noticing the similarities, it was apparently unnecessary to study all the 
schemes. Rather, the study was confined to the four village schemes on the upper reaches 
of the scheme that were much easily accessible. These four village schemes have 210 
households, of which 21 (10%) were interviewed using a questionnaire prepared by the 
research team. Respondents were purposively selected to strike a balance between those 
utilising all their land and those who were partially utilising land. In Thabina, since 
Wards C and D have no irrigation farming going on, farmers were sampled from Wards 
A and B only. The two Wards have 75 farmers. Interviews were conducted with 20 of 
these farmers (27%). Again, respondents were purposively selected to balance fully 
productive with partially productive farmers. In total, 41 farmers occupying 64.30ha of 
land were interviewed. This sample was considered to be representative of the complexity 
and diversity of the land and water issues under investigation.  
  
2.2 Data Collection 
 For the two case studies, primary and secondary data was collected. Regarding the 
primary data, interviews were conducted with the farmers using semi-structured 
questionnaires. Respondents were interviewed while working on their plots to ensure that 
the study captured the responses and understanding of people involved in farming, not 
just the land owners. Once identified, the farmers were purposively categorised into those 
who were fully utilising their land and those who were not. In an effort to balance 
responses, an almost equal number between the two categories was aimed at. In the end 
                                                 
1 These are scheme demarcations, not administrative wards 
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18 farmers fully utilising their plots, 21 not fully utilising and two not farming at all were 
selected for interviewing. Table 1 illustrates the samples. 
 Key informant interviews were also conducted to understand the history of land 
rights and water governance in the case study sites. These informants included the tribal 
authority officers, extension officers, scheme chairpersons, WUA committee members 
and government officials (mainly from the Department of Agriculture) in charge of or 
concerned with the SIS at the municipal office. The interviews gathered information on 
local land administration, implementation of water reform, understanding of scheme 
dynamics, appreciation of challenges faced by SIS farmers, the working of local 
institutions, and government’s plan of action and future priorities.  
 Lastly, participatory observations were done, helping to assess the infrastructure 
used and to measure plot sizes. Observations also validated respondents’ answers, 
especially on water access and use, farm size and landuse. Acts of parliament, white 
papers and information booklets were also used for secondary data. 
 
2.3. Data Analysis 
  Data was analysed within the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
scientific framework. Developed by Ostrom and others (1994), IAD focuses on how rules 
(institutions) and attributes of the physical and cultural world combine to shape 
outcomes. According to Ostrom (1998), the institutional process is affected by three 
variables: attributes of the physical world, attributes of the community concerned and 
rules in use that create incentives and constraints. In the action arena, the variables 
combine to influence interactions among players. Any change in the variables will trigger 
new interactions among players and consequently, new outcomes are realised. In light of 
the current physical availability of both land and water, the incoming institutional 
arrangements will be assessed to determine they will lead to changes in the way that 
farmers use land and water resources. 
 In order to assess these new activities, on communal land, plot productivity is 
used to measure landuse. Plot usage at family and community level, and land transfers, 
are the variables used to discuss results. Since tenure reform is still to be implemented, 
analysis is done on a scenario basis. The unit of analysis in both case studies are the 
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farmers. Data analysis utilised descriptive statistics: Frequency and descriptive statistical 
analysis were implemented on land tenure, landuse, productivity and water use.  
 
3. Results and Analyses – Low productivity and inefficient land use in SIS 
 
3.1 Household Demography and Income 
 The household demography reveals a very elderly farming population, with the 
majority of farmers being well into the pension age (average age of 64.2 in Nzhelele and 
62.5 in Thabina). Nzhelele households are larger, with an average of 6 members per 
household, compared to 4.4 members for Thabina. Such demographic family structures 
inevitably lead to a high dependency ratio in Nzhelele, at 7.9 dependents for each 
working adult, but much lower in Thabina, at 1.6. 
 The farmers depend on a diverse portfolio of livelihoods, namely employment, 
agriculture, remittances, independent activities and government welfare grants. The 
average yearly income per household is ZAR 21,746 in Nzhelele and ZAR 40,142 in 
Thabina. As the heads of households are relatively old, government welfare grants, 
consisting of old age pensions and child grants, represent the major part of the 
households’ income. Welfare grants comprise on average 38.6% of total household 
income (67.0% in Nzhelele and 20.0% in Thabina). Agriculture on the other hand, 
represents an average of 37.5% (12.3% in Nzhelele and 52.0% in Thabina) of total 
household income 
 With employment, remittances and industrial activity contributing 24% of 
income, 62.6% of the households’ income, on average, is thus from non agricultural 
sources for the two schemes. However, besides social grants, agriculture provides more 
income than all the other activities farmers pursue (fetching more than employment, 
remittances and independent activities put together). Table 2 shows the different sources 
of income. 
  
3.2 Access to Land 
 Land administration is under the traditional authority, using a permission to 
occupy (PTO) certificate issued by the chief. The majority of farmers have the PTO in 
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both schemes: 14 in Nzhelele and 14 in Thabina. However, several do not have this PTO 
for various reasons: nine are renting, while four in Nzhelele were never issued with 
PTOs. These farmers are from one particular village which started as an informal 
settlement and therefore had no recognition from the traditional authority.   
  Leasing of land is officially not allowed in both schemes, but in practice it 
happens among farmers. Since this renting is unofficial, there is no documentation for it, 
only verbal agreements between leaser and lessee. A total of nine farmers are actually 
renting plots from friends or relatives. Table 3 shows the number of farmers on each 
tenure arrangement. 
 
3.3. Access to Water 
 In both schemes, water is drawn via a weir and transported by underground pipes 
to overnight storage dams. From there it is delivered by open canals to the plots, where 
furrow irrigation is used to water crops. A scheme committee draws up an irrigation 
timetable where each farmer gets two days in a week to irrigate. Farmers pay R6/month 
as a contribution to the wages of the water bailiff, but not for the water.  
 Water reform has been implemented in the schemes, but not effectively. It seems 
water reform has failed to maintain the infrastructure, nor improve water supply. While 
WUAs have been formed, they are not operational and as a result, there is no change in 
the way water is accessed or used. There is no payment for water and there are no water 
rights or licences, a direct violation of Chapter 4 of the new Water Act (1998), which 
stipulates that all non domestic water use (water use falling under Schedule 1 of the 
Water Act) should be licensed. The schemes are run by government through Extension 
Officers, not by the farmers, contrary to the principles of decentralised water 
management. Water allocation is also based on time – not quantity of water used, making 
it impossible to measure the amounts of water used. Although water reform emphasises 
efficiency, these schemes are still using the wasteful flood irrigation method, which also 
damages soil structures and reduces yields (Postel, 2000).  
 The water reform implementation has been so ineffective that by the time of the 
study, 66% of all the respondents were not aware of water reform, nor of the existence of 
their own WUA. The reform is also set to take longer to establish because running the 
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SIS on a cost recovery basis, as WUAs should do, will be difficult. The current small 
plots do not yield enough cash income to cover water charges, maintenance and running 
costs. Given the farmers’ average income, it is also unlikely that they will afford to self 
finance the schemes. 
 
3.4. Plot Utilisation and Crop Income 
 Land is underutilised in both schemes. Of the 41 plots assessed, 39 were under 
crops at the time of the study, while two were not being farmed at all. Out of the 39, 21 
plots (11 and 10 for Nzhelele and Thabina respectively) are not being fully utilised.  The 
two schemes together have a total of 64.30ha, but only 41.16ha were being cultivated 
during the time of study. Nzhelele farmers are cultivating an average 0.90ha per farmer 
and Thabina farmers are cultivating an average of 1.13ha per farmer, while an average of 
1.30ha and 1.85ha are available per farmer respectively. On average, only 64% of of 
arable land from both schemes is being farmed.  
 A variety of crops are grown, with maize being the most common one in both 
schemes. (15.80ha of the 18.67ha productive land of Nzhelele and 16.50ha of the 22.50ha 
of productive land in Thabina, representing over 78% of total farmed land). Other crops 
are tomatoes, beans and spinach, with one farmer growing cabbages in Thabina. A few 
farmers grow groundnuts and sweet potatoes in Nzhelele, and one farmer has a hectare 
under butternut in Thabina. However, these crops form a very small portion of both total 
cultivated land and total income in each scheme. 
 Farming in Thabina is more market-oriented than in Nzhelele, where 64.7% of 
maize and 62.5% of sweet potatoes produced are consumed. In contrast, Thabina farmers 
sell their entire production of maize, tomatoes, cabbage and butternut. While part of the 
green beans and sweet potatoes are consumed, this only constitutes 5% or less. In 
Nzhelele, the market is largely local and very limited, as farmers sell mostly among 
themselves while peri-urban Thabina have access to an urban market. 
 
3.5. Productivity  
 Not only is land use and plot income low, but also productivity. Plot productivity 
was measured using yields (evaluated in ZAR terms) per hectare. 
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 Thabina farmers are more productive, with an average productivity of ZAR 
22,077.10/ha per year, a figure much higher than the ZAR 13,722.00/ha for Nzhelele 
(Table 4). When productivity is measured for only the land under crops, the figures rise 
by over ZAR 1,000.00 in each case. A brief comparison of the productivity figures will 
show that land is under producing.2 For maize, the National Department of Agriculture 
(NDA) average production is 6.0ton/ha. Nzhelele is producing only 1.4ton/ha, rising to 
2.1ton/ha if we consider only land under crops. This represents 76.7% and 65.0% under 
performance rates respectively. Thabina is faring better, but still under performing with 
2.6ton/ha only, the figure rising to 5.0ton/ha if we consider only productive land. These 
are under performance rates of 55.0% and 16.7% respectively. Even for vegetables, 
production is also way below the NDA averages. Cabbage is 20% below average, green 
beans 50% below average and for spinach; it is much less at 30%. 
 Land productivity is below optimum in both schemes. Besides the clear reason of 
not fully utilising plots by some farmers, plot production is still low for that land under 
crops especially in Nzhelele. 
 
3.6. Constraints to Farming 
 Low productivity is linked to the farming constraints experienced by the farmers. 
Farmers identified lack of water as the major constraint – 81.0% in Nzhelele and 90.0% 
in Thabina. This pertains to inadequate water supply and lack of infrastructure to draw 
water. Irrigation water lacks despite water reform having been implemented in the area. 
As a result, no major improvements can be done on the plots without irrigation water. 
 Shortage of land is not regarded as a farming constraint by the majority of 
farmers. While some farmers require more land than they have, most are interested in 
more secure land rights. In Nzhelele, 38.1% of farmers said they need more land, 
compared to none in Thabina. None of the farmers identified land rights as a constraint. 
However, 76% of all respondents said they preferred private land rights to the current 
PTO. Farmers were asked if they will lease or sell their land after privatisation, only 23% 
are willing to rent out their land after privatisation, and none are willing to sell.  
                                                 
2 The National Department of Agriculture (NDA) statistical section provides an average yield estimate for 
irrigated maize crops and vegetables 
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 Another major problem is the lack of capital to buy inputs. This was mentioned by 
57.1% of the farmers in Nzhelele and 70.0% in Thabina. The cost of land preparation is 
so high that SIS farmers end up ploughing only part of their total land. Since the majority 
of communal farmers are pensioners, they lack not only the physical capacity to manually 
till the land but also adequate income to pay for land preparation and buying of inputs. 
Ploughing is done by hired tractors, which have become too expensive for some farmers 
at ZAR 750 per ha during the time of study. A 50kg bag of Ammonium Nitrate fertiliser 
was costing around ZAR 330. As a result, farmers do not (try to) increase productivity 
through increased inputs.  
 Lastly, access to markets, mentioned by 7.3% of respondents, is also a problem. 
Markets play an important role in income contribution and type of crops grown. The 
choice of crops is closely linked to market opportunities found in both schemes. As 
detailed before, Thabina is in a peri-urban area, and their agriculture is more market 
oriented. That explains why they fetch more income from agriculture. On the other hand, 
the more rurally located Nzhelele farmers farm for consumption and only sell the surplus. 
The very limited local market share fails to give incentives to farmers. Consequently, 
their agricultural income is minimal. Table 5 illustrates respondents’ farming constraints. 
 
4. Discussion - The necessary but not sufficient combination of land and water 
reform 
 
 When land tenure reform will be implemented, private land rights will be given 
on either individual or community basis. It is expected that more effective land use will 
ensue, as land rights will allow farmers to privately hold, lease or sell land. As such, all 
land, it is expected, should therefore be put under crops, increasing productivity and 
achieving self sufficiency. It will ‘awaken dead capital’, in De Soto’s (2000) words.  
 This assumption is based on the view that it is an unclear land rights system that 
has contributed to the current underutilisation of land.  Given that the farmers not fully 
utilising their plots are not leasing part of their land because of some perceived 
vulnerability, this view is understandable.  It partly explains why 76% of the farmers are 
in favour of land property titles.  
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 However, land rights alone will not guarantee increased landuse. Two main 
reasons stand out. The first is that in the present SIS setting, land property rights alone 
will not create a land market. Although the majority of farmers want land tenure reform, 
they seem to want the title deeds more for protection from traditional authority than for 
production reasons. This implies that very few currently active farmers will be able to get 
more land for use after tenure reform. Farmers evidently value land more as a safety net 
than as a productive asset (Denison and Manona, 2007).  The creation of a land market 
through leasing and selling is therefore not going to automatically begin after 
privatisation because the majority of farmers have no intention of selling or leasing land. 
 The second reason is the multiple livelihoods nature of communal SIS 
households. These alternative sources of income take away the incentive to fully utilise 
the available land. Kamara et al (2002) say that for farmers to take any serious interest in 
farming, agriculture has to provide a larger proportion of household income. Farming is 
not the major household income provider here, characterising only a small part of the 
total household income like in all small-scale farms in South Africa (Perret et al, 2005).  
 Besides the two reasons, other factors detailed earlier will still hinder agricultural 
production after privatisation, notably the cost of inputs, lack of market opportunities and 
the lack of irrigation water. 
 As shown by the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, the 
physical environment, consisting of the resources and the characteristics of the 
community, combines with the rules in use to influence access to resources in the 
community (Ostrom, 1990). In this study, farmers have low household incomes, pursue 
multiple livelihoods and are on communal land, surviving mainly on government welfare 
grants. They also lack access to markets, have little productive capacity and tend to value 
land sentimentally. These attributes exist in a community where access rules are 
undergoing transformation. Having been used to decades of communal ownership of land 
and water, the farmers are unfamiliar with rights and privatisation. There is not only a 
lack of knowledge on how rights work, but also an apparent sceptical appreciation of the 
incoming rules.  
 Rules in use are still communal when it comes to land and although they are 
supposed to be private for water, they are also still based on common use. As a result, the 
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schemes are in transition to new rules (rights). It is therefore quite difficult to effectively 
assess the action arena and rank the outcomes. 
 However, results show that no significant changes might take place in the action 
arena after the new policies are implemented. The new policies alone are not enough to 
create new interactions or institutions at local level, like land and water usage and trading 
rights. As mentioned in the previous section, the water policy has not been effectively 
established to take effect and to amend historically built institutions, which is not 
happening in this case. For example, water use has not changed. In addition, it is shown 
that land tenure reform, when implemented, is also unlikely to lead to any new outcomes, 
as it is not taking into consideration the context and needs of the farmers. Renewed land 
rights alone seem insufficient to increase productivity (when water reform is ineffective 
and markets and inputs, within a multiple livelihoods context, are not considered). To use 
Ostrom (1998), although the policy environment has changed, attributes of the 
community concerned and rules in use that create incentives and constraints have not. 
Subsequently, there will not be any significant new interactions among actors and 
between actors and resources, leading to no new outcomes.  
 The failure of water reform is not surprising. Research has shown that new water 
institutions have largely been very ineffective and not beneficial to the previously 
disadvantaged (Swatuk, 2005).  This is mainly due to a weak conceptualisation of new 
water policies (Manzungu, 2004). There was no capacity building or adequate 
stakeholder consultation when the WUAs were established. Water reform has not 
changed farmers’ situation, as it was not effectively implemented, and immediate water 
needs still remain a major constraint. 
 
5. Conclusion – The need for a more integrated, overall reform of the agricultural 
and rural sector 
 
 Clearer land rights will bring tenure security, but land rights alone will be 
inadequate to increase productivity, Cousins (2009), pointed out. Water rights have failed 
to take effect, resulting in no improved access to water. There is obviously a need for a 
coordinated approach for land and water reform, especially given that water reform was 
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attempted but land is still communally owned and the water rights are not working.  
However, there will be a limit to potential benefits of land tenure and water reforms, 
whether articulated or implemented separately or together. While most of the communal 
farmers feel vulnerable under the current tenure arrangements and refuse to prefer 
privatisation, leasing or selling of land is in the majority of the cases improbable even 
after privatisation of land rights. And farming challenges like market access and cost of 
inputs have solutions that are outside the scope of land-water reforms. 
 So linking land to water reform might have a positive impact, but the latter is not 
guaranteed and would remain limited. As such, SA’s land and water reform will not make 
farmers self sufficient, nor will it increase productivity, promote self-sufficiency and 
reduce poverty. To effectively address equity and promote rural development water-land-
reform should be linked to broader agrarian reforms, considering support services, market  
access and the overall rural multiple livelihoods in SA. Farmers need a more integrated, 
overall reform of the agricultural and rural sector. 
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Table 1: Communal land sample 
Study site Sample 
popn 
No. 
intrvwd 
No. fully 
using plots 
No. not fully 
using plots 
No. not 
farming at all 
Nzhelele  210 21 9 11 1 
Thabina  75 20 9 10 1 
Total  285 41 18 21 2 
 
 
Table 2: Farmers’ Household Income 
Source  Nzhelele 
(ZAR) 
Thabina 
(ZAR) 
Combined 
(ZAR) 
  N=21 N=20 N=41 
Gross Agricultural  
Income (Rand) 
Min 
Max 
Average 
Std deviation 
0 
20 330 
2 687 
4 954 
 
0 
76 200 
20 782 
18 442 
0 
76 200 
11 514 
16 052 
Employment 
(Rand) 
 
 
Min 
Max 
Average 
Std deviation 
0 
14 400 
1 305 
3 582 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
14 400 
668 
2 618 
Independent 
Activities (rand) 
Min 
Max 
Average 
Std deviation 
0 
19 200 
1 029 
4 129 
0 
60 000 
5 050 
14 144 
0 
60 000 
2 990 
10 391 
Remittances 
 
 
 
Min 
Max 
Average 
Std deviation 
0 
12 000 
2 144 
3 924 
0 
60 000 
5 350 
13 472 
0 
60 000 
3 693 
9828 
Welfare (old age 
pension, child 
grant)  
 
 
 
Min 
Max 
Average 
Std deviation 
0 
36 000 
14 611 
10 175 
0 
24 000 
9 000 
9 437 
0 
36 000 
11 874 
10 106 
Total  Min 
Max 
Average 
Std deviation 
7 800 
42 000 
21 746 
10 310 
11 000 
85 000 
40 142 
20 456 
7 800 
85 000 
30 739 
18 411 
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Table 3: Land Rights 
 Nzhelele 
N=21 
Thabina 
N=20 
Combined 
N= 41 
Farmers with PTO 14 14 28 
Farmers who are renting 3 6 9 
Farmers with no tenure rights 4 0 4 
 
 
Table 4: Plot’s crop income per hectare - production 
    Nzhelele 
N=21 
Thabina 
N=20 
Combined 
N=41 
Land Productivity (yr) 
ZAR/ha  
Min 
Max 
Average  
Std deviation 
0.00 
46 668.00 
13 722.00 
13 205.10 
0.00 
72 400.00 
22 077.10 
19 523.10 
0.00 
72 400.00 
17 797.60 
16 914.80 
Land Productivity (yr) 
ZAR/ha (for cropped 
land only) 
Min 
Max 
Average  
Std deviation 
2 500.00 
46 668.00 
15 166.42 
13 062.42 
8 640.00 
72 400.00 
23 239.00 
19 334.49 
2 500.00 
72 400.00 
19 202.71 
16 780.92 
 
 
 
 Table 5: Constraints to Farming 
Constraint Positive Responses 
 Nzhelele Thabina Combined 
 # 
farmers
% # 
farmers
% # 
farmers 
% 
Land tenure/rights 2 9.5 0 0.0 2 4.9 
Land scarcity 8 38.1 0 0.0 8 19.5 
Low product prices  3 14.3 0 0.0 3 7.3 
Lack of market outlets 2 9.5 1 5.0 3 7.3 
Lack of irrigation water 17 81.0 18 90.0 35 85.4 
Labour 2 9.5 1 5.0 3 7.3 
Lack of money/capital 12 57.1 14 70.0 26 63.4 
Lack of infrastructure 3 14.3 1 5.0 4 9.8 
 
 
 
